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TACKING IN STORMY WEATHER: THE SHIPPING
ACT OF 1984
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States merchant marine is currently losing a sub-
stantial percentage of potential shipping revenues to foreign com-
petitors. Statistics indicate that domestic liners transport only
4.2% of the total United States imports and exports carried by
sea.1 More significantly, foreign carriers are receiving approxi-
mately seventy percent of all shipping revenues available in United
States trade. 2 Although awareness of the merchant marine's weak-
ened position is increasing,3 finding an adequate solution is made
I Gonzalez, Bilateralism: The Solution to an Antiquated International Shipping Policy,
36 J. INT'L AFF. 329, 329 (1983). The statistics were calculated for 1979. In contrast, Japan's
merchant marine transported over 40% of total Japanese imports and exports during the
same year. Id. Norway, Spain, Great Britain, Greece, West Germany, and France all main-
tain merchant marines which transport at least 30% of their own foreign trades. CANNON,
SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, SHIPPING ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1978, S. REP. No. 966, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 966].
The Soviet Union has a fleet which transports an astounding 50% of its international com-
merce. Id.
2 Garvey, Regulatory Reform in the Ocean Shipping Industry: An Extraordinary U.S.
Commitment to Cartels, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 38 (1984). This 70% figure
was derived by comparing the percentage of United States trade carried in foreign vessels to
the total amount of shipping revenues generated by United States trade. Consequently, the
denominator in this ratio included revenues from United States coastal trade and was not
restricted to revenues from United States export and import trade. The Jones Act of 1919
requires that United States vessels and crews perform all coastal trade, including the lucra-
tive market of transporting Alaskan oil to the other 49 states. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, PROTECTION-
ISM AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 11 (1984). If the revenues from the coastal
trade were removed from the denominator and the percentage of United States trade car-
ried in foreign vessels was compared only to revenues available to the international market,
the 70% figure would be higher. This adjusted figure would more accurately reflect the dom-
inance of foreign carriers.
I The present share of United States foreign trade transported by the United States
merchant marine is down from a 42.3% share in 1950. S. REP. No. 966, supra note 1, at 3.
The decline is pronounced even more by comparison to the mid-nineteenth century when
the United States merchant fleet carried approximately 90% of United States imports and
exports. C. McDowELL & H. GIaBS, OCEAN TRANSPORTATION 21 (1954).
Modern nations recognize the importance to national security, international trade, and
overall economic development of maritime transportation. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at
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difficult by the overriding political inclination to preserve tradi-
tional antitrust policies. Strict adherence to these historical poli-
cies is the primary source of the problems experienced by the
United States merchant marine.4 The Shipping Act of 19845 repre-
sents an effort to reverse the merchant marine's steady decline and
to address the realities of an international shipping industry.
This Note examines the nature of the shipping industry, consid-
ering the market structure and congressional policies which have
contributed to the present problems of the United States merchant
marine. Also, this Note reviews the Shipping Act of 1984, passed
by Congress to halt the decline of the United States shipping in-
dustry and improve the merchant marine's position among inter-
national counterparts. This Note concludes that more extensive
legislative reform abandoning the outdated antitrust philosophies7
9. In the United States, the monetary value of trade carried by sea is enormous. Figures
from 1977 show that $166.5 billion in United States foreign trade or 84% of the total United
States foreign trade was moved by ship. S. REP. No. 966, supra note 1, at 3.
Note, The Shipping Act of 1916: Proposed Amendments and their Impact on the U.S.
Merchant Marine, 15 J. INrr'L L. & ECON. 639, 639 (1981). For example, Sen. Metzenmbaum
recently opposed legislative reform in the United States shipping industry contending that
such reform was contrary to a free enterprise system. 130 CONG. REC. S1578 (daily ed. Feb.
23, 1984).
5 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1701-1720 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as the "new Act," the "1984
Act," the "1984 Shipping Act," or the "Shipping Act of 1984"].
6 Congress elaborated its goals for the new Act in a declaration of policy which reads as
follows:
The purposes of this Act are -
(1) to establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory process for the common carriage
of goods by water in the foreign commerce of the United States with a minimum
of governmental intervention and regulatory costs;
(2) to provide an efficient and economic transportation system in the ocean
commerce of the United States that is, insofar as possible, in harmony with, and
responsive to, international shipping practice; and
(3) to encourage the development of an economically sound and efficient United
States-flag liner fleet capable of meeting national security needs.
Id. § 1701.
These philosophies include a rigid adherence to promoting free trade and vigorous com-
petition. Note, supra note 4, at 639. Sen. Metzenmbaum is a leading advocate of antitrust
principles. During debate over the 1984 Shipping Act, Sen. Metzenmbaum expressed his
views as follows:
I am one of those who believes very strongly in a free enterprise system, in the
right to compete and that competition should not be hindered in any way whatso-
ever, and that when two or more business groups or businesses or people get to-
gether to fix prices or to divide up a market, they have not served our Nation's
best purposes.
130 CONG. REc. S1578 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984).
Recently, legislators began to question whether or not strict antitrust philosophies are
appropriate in the shipping industry. In supporting the 1984 Shipping Act, Rep. Rodino
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of the past may be necessary if United States liners are to function
as viable competitors in this unique world market.
II. THE PROBLEM
The seriousness of the merchant marine's present status is re-
flected in the atypical degree of cooperation shown among both
carriers 8 and shippers' in supporting legislative reform, including
the Shipping Act of 1984.10 Normally, these two groups have diver-
gent short-term interests which dictate different legislative ap-
proaches. Carriers seek income maximization through the mainte-
nance of the highest possible shipping rates, while shippers seek
profit maximization through cost reductions in the form of con-
trolled, lower rates.1 Consequently, shippers seek greater govern-
mental control over carriers and freight charges, while carriers de-
sire less governmental regulation. Both groups, however, recognize
that the decline of the merchant marine will continue unless a
market equilibrium' 2 is established. If left unchecked, the present
decline could result in a marketplace without United States carri-
stated:
Although many of us believe that cartels are fundamentally inconsistent with
the competitive principles underlying our economic system, we must confront re-
ality. Most other nations with whom we trade either sanction or support the cartel
system. Carriers that serve the U.S. trades must be given a clear set of rules that
allows them to function in this international environment.
130 CONG. REc. H1290 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984). One commentator specifically pinpointed the
free trade philosophy of the last century as a major cause of the United States merchant
marine's present deteriorated status. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 338-39.
8 A common carrier means a person holding itself out to the general public to provide
transportation by water of passengers or cargo between the United States and a foreign
country for compensation. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(6). A common carrier under the Shipping
Act must assume responsibility for the transportation of the passengers or cargo from the
port or point of receipt to the port or point of destination and must utilize, for all or part of
that transportation, a vessel operating on the high seas or the Great Lakes between a port in
the United States and a port in a foreign country. Id. Throughout this Note, the term liner
is used interchangeably with the term carrier.
' A shipper means an owner or person for whose account the ocean transportation of
cargo is provided or the person to whom delivery is to be made. Id. § 1702(23). One author
defined a shipper as an exporter or importer purchasing shipping services for transport of
goods. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 344.
1o Sen. Packwood noted that "the Shipping Act of 1984, is unusual in that it represents a
consensus of carriers and shippers." 130 CONG. R c. S1577 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984).
" Id.
In theory, production at equilibrium is the goal of a competitive market and generates
benefits for all participants. See Hanson, Regulation of the Shipping Industry: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Need for Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 973, 979 (1980). See
also note 31 infra.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 15:249
ers, in which United States shippers would be subject to conditions
imposed by foreign carriers, foreign policies, and foreign inter-
ests.13 The present situation requires legislation with a long-term
focus. Consequently, both shippers and carriers support the Ship-
ping Act of 1984 as an instrument to improve the deteriorating
shipping industry in the United States.
Opponents of the 1984 Shipping Act contend that United States
liners are not facing financial disaster.14 These opponents favor the
historical position rooted in the predecessor of the 1984 Act, the
Shipping Act of 1916.11 The 1916 Act provided a regulatory frame-
work emphasizing traditional antitrust principles and a free mar-
ket concept. 6 Opponents of the new Act explain that the failure of
any particular liner and low returns on investments for liners 7 are
consequences of business mistakes' s and not the by-product of
United States policy.'"
Market statistics, however, indicate that something beyond poor
13 Note, supra note 4, at 639.
14 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1982), reprinted in
CONG. REC. (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984), supra note 4, at S1580. The Government Accounting
Office (GAO) Report found that while the merchant marine was plagued by inefficiencies
and high costs, the United States liner fleet was not in the state of decline ascribed to it. Id.
In a response to the GAO Report, however, the Department of Transportation took excep-
tion to the conclusions that the condition of the United States liner fleet did not justify
legislative reform. Id. at S1596.
" 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the "old Act," the "1916 Act,"
the "1916 Shipping Act," or the "Shipping Act of 1916"].
" Note, supra note 4, at 644. The 1916 Shipping Act granted only limited antitrust im-
munity balancing the traditional antitrust goal of unrestricted competition with the recog-
nized need for stability in the shipping industry. Id. The Supreme Court construed the
Shipping Act of 1916 "as conferring only a 'limited antitrust exemption' in light of the fact
that 'antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy.'" Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973).
'7 Between 1976 and 1980, the industry generated a return on assets of between 0.9% and
6.1%. During the same period, long-term debt increased from 0.76 of equity to 3.83 times
equity. The ratio of current assets to current liabilities fell from 1:7 to 1:3. The liner indus-
try's return on equity in 1979 was less than one-fifth the all-industry average. In 1981, it was
less than half and over the last five years has never been greater than two-thirds of the all-
industry average. 130 CONG. REC. S1579 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (statement of Sen. Long).
'" One commentator noted that the economic performance of some liner companies dem-
onstrates that there are efficient, highly profitable firms as well as the highly visible, unsuc-
cessful ones. The commentator thus implies that the failure of any liner is the result of
business inefficiency on the part of its officers since other liners survive and are profitable.
Garvey, supra note 2, at 21; see also 130 CONG. REC. S1584-85 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984)
(Chapter Three of the GAO Report which proposes that the United States liner fleet per-
forms adequately despite the provisions of the 1916 Act).
10 The policy of promoting free trade and vigorous competition through antitrust laws is
embodied in the Shipping Act of 1916. Note, supra note 4, at 639, 644.
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business judgment is crippling the United States merchant marine.
In the aggregate, the United States merchant marine transported
34.6 million tons in 1980, 5.4 million tons less than in 1974.0 While
the fleets of other countries were adapting to the changing world
market, the United States merchant marine remained stagnant."
This stagnation was marked by sluggish construction of new ves-
sels and a fleet growing rapidly obsolete, problems which
threaten the future of shipping in the United States.
The problems associated with a declining United States
merchant marine are not confined to the participating shippers
and carriers. A weak shipping industry has an impact on the entire
economy. A deteriorating merchant marine reduces the United
States balance of payments account. This reduction means that
United States dollars are diverted away from the domestic market
and into foreign markets. 3 A weak shipping effort also reduces the
level of employment in the shipping services industry, resulting in
fewer jobs for United States citizens. 4
From a noneconomic standpoint, the former regulatory scheme
eroded national security which to a large degree depends upon the
existence of a strong merchant marine. Consequently, the current
,0 Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 330. United States vessels carried 6.5% of the total 628.9
million tons of United States foreign trade during 1974. By comparison, United States ves-
sels carried only 4.2% of the total 823.1 million tons of United States foreign trade during
1980. Id.
" The United States merchant marine ranked eleventh worldwide based on the number
of vessels and eighth based on tonnage capacity. By contrast, Japan's fleet ranked fifth and
third respectively, while the Soviet fleet ranked second and seventh respectively. The
United States fleet included 257 freighters, 285 tankers, 22 bulk carriers, and 6 combination
passenger-cargo vessels. By comparison, the Japanese fleet included 756 freighters, 487
tankers, 500 bulk carriers, and 8 combination passenger-cargo vessels, while the Soviet fleet
had 1,828 freighters, 470 tankers, 156 bulk carriers, and 58 combination passenger-cargo
vessels. Id. at 330-31.
" An inventory in 1979 showed that of 567 ships, 30% were built prior to 1955. Of the
remaining vessels, 20% ranged in age from fifteen to nineteen years. Construction of new
vessels in the United States is less than ambitious. By contrast, both Japan and the Soviet
Union are experiencing rapid vessel construction programs. Japan announced plans to in-
crease its dry-bulk fleet by an additional 83 dry-bulk tankers. The United States has
adopted no measures to stimulate development of a dry-bulk fleet even though the National
Coal Association projected that steam coal exports would increase from a level of zero in
1978 to 90 million tons by 1985, and 150 million tons by 1990. Id.
,' Id. at 332. National shipping services earn foreign exchange dollars by providing ser-
vices abroad and by conserving dollars which would otherwise have to be paid to foreign
carriers. Between 1957 and 1966, the United States merchant marine contributed a
favorable five billion dollars to the balance of payments account. Id.
4 Id. In 1946, the shipping industry employed nearly 115,000 United States citizens; in
1980, fewer than 21,000 citizens worked in the United States shipping industry. Id.
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merchant marine does not adequately meet national security de-
mands.2" More than half of the seventy commodities listed by the
Defense Department as essential to national security are carried on
foreign-flag vessels.26 Such a precarious situation could lead to dis-
astrous consequences during a national emergency.27 History dem-
I d. at 331. Congressmen from both houses cited national defense as a major reason to
reform the 1916 Shipping Act. 130 CONG. REC. S1569 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (statement of
Sen. Stevens); 130 CONG. REC. H1296 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Forsythe).
26 Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 331. These commodities could be carried by United States
owned ships flagged in foreign countries; however, the service of such vessels could not be
guaranteed in the event of a national crisis since international law does not grant the United
States jurisdiction over foreign vessels. Id. As Captain Jan A.A. Van Lier stated, "[wihere
were these ships during the Vietnam War? Was the military sealift command able to call
upon American-owned ships? Of course not! Our aging merchant fleet served our supply
liner virtually unaided." Id.
27 MARAD Authorization, Fiscal Year 1984, and Oversight-Part 1: Hearings on H.R.
2114 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1983) (report on American Shipping In War) [here-
inafter cited as MARAD]. The report concludes that no reliable substitute exists for a
strong United States merchant marine. Substitute sources considered included: (1) North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, (2) ships of subsidiaries of United States own-
ers registered under flags of convenience, and (3) the neutral world fleet. Id. at 5.
Resort to these sources was deemed infeasible because:
1. The NATO fleet comprises under 7,000 liner, bulk and tank vessels of all
types, ages, sizes and configurations. The fleet suitable for U.S. service consists of
about 3,850 units. That 42 percent of these suitable ships are of Greek registry
presents in itself a political problem of some complexity in measuring the reliabil-
ity of resources; in major part, also, Greek ships are manned by non-nationals, and
indeed non-Europeans.
The great difficulty with the NATO fleet lies in its manifest insufficiency for the
indicated requirements of the European nations themselves, which have been esti-
mated at 6,000 units. This leaves no margin at all for the wastages and inefficien-
cies of wartime operations. It certainly leaves no room for international cross-trad-
ing between the United States and non-European nations. It must therefore be
accepted that the NATO members will at once abandon the cross-trades, and will
actually attempt to draw in additional tonnage from every source.
The NATO fleets will not therefore cushion our deficiencies of supply, but will
on the contrary become a negative factor, opening with our own compelled with-
drawal a gap in our trade with non-European countries (based on the depressed
year 1981) amounting to 50 percent of the liner movement, 41 percent of the bulk,
and 30 percent of the tanker. Mobilization of the American coastwise tank fleet
significantly widens the gap.
2. A second presumed source is tonnage under flag of convenience owned by
subsidiaries of American nationals, and considered under effective American con-
trol. Viewed from the physical point of view, this fleet contains practically no
freighters, and the dry-bulk sector would fall far short of requirements created by
withdrawal of NATO tonnage from our trades; the tanker sector, which is the
largest constituent, is markedly deficient in clean-products carriers, and margin-
ally adequate in crude carriers of various sizes before allowing for wartime casual-
ties. From the political viewpoint, there persists grave doubt whether foreign-flag
ships will prove reliable, manned as they are by non-NATO crews employed be-
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onstrates that a strong merchant marine is crucial to national se-
curity.2 8 Recognition by Congress of the seriousness of this
problem was the primary impetus for the reforms embodied in the
1984 Shipping Act.29
The presently weakened United States merchant marine is the
result of two interacting factors. First, international shipping func-
tions within a unique market structure. Second, prior congressional
and judicial policies have failed to recognize fully this special
structure. The unique market structure interacted with and pro-
nounced the negative effects of poor policy.
A. A Unique Market Structure
The shipping industry is not conducted in a stable and competi-
cause they are cheap, and who are therefore without national loyalty in the great
causes that divide the West.
3. The same and similar considerations of a political nature affect the neutral
fleets. Moreover, there remains the question whether nations such as Japan, Ko-
rea, and others much less economically independent can withstand Soviet pressure
to maintain strict neutrality. We rely at present to a very great extent on Japanese
production of crucial military components; Japan is also the world's largest ship-
builder. If we should prove unable to guarantee her protection, and she chose to
remain neutral, our failure to build equivalent facilities here may prove fatal.
Id.
The Soviet Union has refused to rely upon foreign sources of shipping. The Soviet
merchant fleet has grown in proportion as the United States fleet has declined. Id; see also
supra notes 1 and 21 (citing figures on the size of the Soviet fleet).
The emergence of the Soviet Union as the owner of one of the newest and fastest-growing
commercial liner fleets brings the fear that such state-owned fleets will be conducted in
pursuit of national political goals, rather than profits. These state-owned carriers backed by
national treasuries could drive private companies out of business through rate-cutting. The
state-owned competitor's true aims might be earning hard currencies, projecting economic
power or despoiling another nation's business. Agman, Competition, Rationalization, and
United States Shipping Policy, 8 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 40 (1976).
' MARAD, supra note 27, at 4. Ironically, the Shipping Act of 1916 was essentially an
emergency measure to counteract a shortage of tonnage and its detrimental impact on
United States foreign commerce. Since the Civil War, the United States merchant fleet had
steadily declined, and by 1910, its vessels were carrying only 10% of the total volume of
United States foreign trade. As the First World War broke out, European nations withdrew
their vessels from the United States trade, causing dramatic increases in freight charges.
The cost of shipping grain from the United States to Great Britian rose from 5 cents to 50
cents a bushel. Basedow, Common Carriers Continuity and Disintegration in U.S. Trans-
portation Law, 13 TRANSP. L. J. 1, 31 (1983). More recently, the war in the Falkland Islands
demonstrated the importance of a country's maintaining a strong merchant marine for naval
planning. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 331.
29 130 CONG. REC. S1569 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (statement of Sen. Stevens); 130 CONG.
REc. H1296 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Forsythe). An express purpose of the
1984 Act is to develop a United States fleet capable of meeting national security needs.
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1701(3).
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tive market.30 Since the benefit of a competitive market, produc-
tion at equilibrium,31 is not present, the basic stability and effi-
ciency of the industry are threatened.
Three conditions exist in the shipping industry which combine
to create its unique market structure. First, the barriers to entry
into the industry are relatively low while the barriers to exit are
high.3 2 Second, the industry is capital intensive.33 Finally, the de-
mand for shipping is basically price inelastic.3 4
Low barriers to entry result from the low research and develop-
ment costs3 5 associated with the liner industry, which is perceived
as a technologically conservative industry., Entry into the liner in-
dustry is not predicated upon technological capabilities but instead
'* Hanson, supra note 12, at 979. The conditions necessary for a stable competitive mar-
ket include: (1) the presence in the market of many independent producers of relatively
equal size; (2) maintenance of production volume initially near the level at which marginal
cost equals marginal revenue; (3) ability to shift productive resources freely among alterna-
tive uses, even in the short run; and (4) elasticity of supply and demand. Id. at 977.
" Theoretically, production at equilibrium in a competitive market is both efficient and
stable, resulting in probable benefits to both carriers and shippers. First, productive capac-
ity is organized so that prices of products are equal to per-unit costs plus a reasonable re-
turn on invested capital, thus benefiting carriers. Second, each firm operates at peak effi-
ciency, producing its output at the least possible cost per-unit, thus benefiting shippers. Id.
at 979.
" Neff, The UN Code of Conduct For Liner Conferences, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 398, 399
(1980). Since sophisticated technological abilities are not required to enter this particular
industry, the barriers to entry are considered low. A new participant need only to have the
monetary capability which is a requisite of entry into any industry and presumably can be
obtained through ordinary financing. Thus in comparison to technologically intensive indus-
tries, the shipping industry has lower entry requirements. As Neff points out, "the capital
required for entry into the shipping business has consisted 'only' of money and not of know-
how." Id. at 400 (emphasis added). Once the money or financing is secured, however, the
shipping industry becomes costly to exit. Id.
Id.; Hanson, supra note 12, at 980; Note, supra note 4, at 640.
Hanson, supra note 12, at 980; Neff, supra note 32, at 399.
Elasticity of demand refers to the relationship between proportionate changes
in the amount of a good or service that is purchased and proportionate changes in
its price or proportionate changes in the buyer's rate of income. When a change in
price produces more than a proportionate change in the quantities bought, the
demand is said to be price elastic. Conversely, when a change in price produces a
less than a proportionate change in the quantities bought, then demand is called
price inelastic.
D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS 16 n.9 (1953).
31 Neff, supra note 32, at 399.
" Id. at 399-400. Some commentators, however, have noted recent technological advances
in liner shipping. Garvey, supra note 2, at 22 (noting in particular the development and
adoption of container technology); Note, supra note 4, at 640 (referring to technological
advances in vessels). Nonetheless, the industry has a reputation as being among the most
conservative of industries technologically.
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is available to anyone with the monetary capacity.3 7 Moreover,
since ships have relatively long useful lives 8 and the resale market
for a ship is limited,39 exit from the industry is extremely sluggish
even when the market would indicate that such a strategy is pref-
erable. 0 The result is a constant tendency toward overtonnage,41
with the consequence that profits in the industry are quite low.42
The capital-intensive nature43 of the industry creates a market
structure with a high percentage of fixed costs." To meet the de-
mands of shippers, carriers must maintain fixed schedules, thereby
increasing the high percentage of fixed costs. 4' After covering these
initially high fixed costs, carriers could handle extra cargo at rela-
tively low per-unit costs. 46 Carriers, however, must first generate
enough volume to cover the fixed costs. Thus a carrier finds it eco-
nomically desirable to utilize the full capacity of the ship since va-
riable costs are low and unused capacity cannot be stored for later
use.4 7 Carriers are, therefore, inherently motivated to engage in
37 Neff, supra note 32, at 400.
11 Hanson, supra note 12, at 980. Ships have useful lives of up to 25 years. Neff, supra
note 32, at 400.
3, Hanson, supra note 12, at 980.
0 "[T]he fact that ships last up to twenty-five years means that exit from industry, even
in times of low profitability, is extremely sluggish." Neff, supra note 32, at 400. Obviously,
the limited resale market compounds the lock-in effects of ships' long useful lives. As one
commentator noted, "Carriers will try to maintain their level of service even during eco-
nomic downturns. The relevant decision is whether to maintain the service level or go bank-
rupt, not whether the level of service should be reduced in small increments." Ellsworth,
Competition or Rationalization in the Liner Industry, 10 J. MAR. L. & Com. 497, 5d6 (1979).
" Overtonnaging occurs when there is more than adequate shipping capacity (tonnage)
available on a route. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 344.
" Neff, supra note 32, at 400. When the shipping capacity exceeds the demand for ship-
ping services, carriers are likely to engage in competitive bidding to attract the limited num-
ber of consumers. Id.
'3 The liner business is labeled as capital intensive because start-up costs for entry into
the industry are relatively high as compared to other industries. Fixed costs such as capital
costs for construction or payments on long-term charters comprise approximately 80% of
the total costs of a liner operator. Moreover, a larger number of fixed expenses exist which
do not vary according to the amount of cargo handled. These fixed expenses or constant
costs include wages and bunker fuel costs. Id. These fixed and constant costs constitute
practically all of the expenses incurred by a liner operator. The only truly variable costs are
handling costs, brokerage, and wharfage. Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 506.
" Note, supra note 4, at 640.
45 Id. Liner shipping is a transportation service which utilizes regularly scheduled ocean
carriers sailing on established routes. In contrast, tramp carriers maintain irregular routes
and schedule sailings only when sufficient cargo is available. Liner shipping is the prevalent
form of shipping in the United States. Id. at 640 n.9.
11 Id. at 640.
17 Id.; Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 506-07.
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competitive rate-cutting48 to generate the necessary volume to
cover fixed costs.
Compounding the inherent tendency to engage in rate wars is
the price-inelastic demand for liner services.49 Inelasticity of de-
mand means that price reductions or increases do not alter the de-
mand for liner services. 50 Price cuts, consequently, mean decreased
revenues5 because demand does not increase in any proportion to
the price reduction. An inelastic demand combined with the inher-
ent tendency for rate wars makes destructive pricing a reality.2
These basic characteristics inherent in the shipping industry
would create in a competitive market a dramatic economic cycle,53
generating excitement and insolvency54 for both carriers and ship-
pers alike. During the nineteenth century, a devastating series of
rate wars 55 prompted the survivors to search for an effective mode
of addressing the economic realities of the industry.5
B. A Unique Market Response
Liners sensitive to the destructive tendencies of the industry cre-
ated conferences 57 which were basically agreements among carriers
Note, supra note 4, at 640; Neff, supra note 32, at 400.
4 Note, supra note 4, at 640.
s See supra note 34.
5' Note, supra note 4, at 641.
5S Id.
If prices declined in the initial phases of a rate war but the reduction in prices
resulted in a surge in demand then the war would be of a short duration. On the
other hand, if the reduction in price led to a reduction in revenue because demand
was price inelastic then the rate war could become serious.
Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 509.
11 Hanson, supra note 12, at 980.
"Shipping, in short, is a classic boom-and-bust industry, a source of much excitement
and insolvency." Neff, supra note 32, at 401. The commentator is referring to a business
cycle with short time intervals between the expansion and contraction phases. A business
cycle consists of fluctuations in the general level of economic activity as measured by such
variables as the rate of unemployment and changes in real Gross National Product (GNP).
A boom is the high point of the business cycle as indicated by a low rate of unemployment
and rapid growth in real GNP. Booms come at the end of expansion phases. A bust or
recession is the low point of the business cycle, characterized by a high rate of unemploy-
ment and a slow rate of growth, or even a decline, in real GNP. Recessions come at the end
of contraction phases. J. GWARTNEY & R. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE
138 (2d ed. 1980).
Neff, supra note 32, at 401; Note, supra note 4, at 641.
s Note, supra note 4, at 641.
67 Id. The invention of the liner conference system followed a series of rate wars in the
1870's. Neff, supra note 32, at 401.
In its simplest form, a liner conference is merely a multilateral covenant not to cut rates.
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to combat the tendency toward destructive pricing and to prevent
wasteful overtonnage resulting in insolvency. 5 Coordination be-
tween conference members to reduce costs by minimizing waste
and increasing utilization of assets is known as rationalization."9
Conference systems and rationalization have changed very little
since their inception60 and are the means by which most developed
nations achieve stable merchant marines.61
The basic tools of the conference system, including joint rate-
setting, market division, and discounts for exclusive patronage, are
illegal under United States antitrust laws.62 Consequently, United
States liners could not operate in a conference system without a
grant of immunity from these antitrust laws. United States policy-
makers have been reluctant to allow the merchant marine to con-
form totally to international shipping practices.63 Instead, prior
regulatory schemes have attempted to strike a balance between the
traditional antitrust goal of unrestrained competition and the in-
Most conferences, however, are more complicated in form and assume cartel-like roles. Con-
ferences typically allocate sailings among member carriers and negotiate loyalty arrange-
ments with individual shippers, offering either preferential rates or deferred rebates to loyal
shippers. Id. Conferences provide a tangible economic benefit in the form of predictability
of rates and services. Id. at 403.
8 Note, supra note 4, at 641.
5' See Agman, supra note 27, at 2. Rationalization is the organization of a business or
industry in an orderly manner to avoid waste through coordination of effort. When utilized
by a single enterprise, rationalization is praised as evidence of efficient management. When
jointly applied by an entire industry, rationalization is criticized as monopolistic. Under
United States law, when an entire industry is allowed to rationalize, as in the case of many
utilities, it invariably is regulated. Complete regulation of liner shipping, however, is im-
practicable because the industry is international and not fully subject to the force of United
States law. Id.
*o Neff, supra note 32, at 401.
Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 498. United States law and policy has regarded conferences
as an evil to be endured rather than a constructive force in the international economy.
Agman, supra note 27, at 1. By contrast, developing countries recognize the necessity of
conference systems as a means to develop third world merchant fleets. Neff, supra note 32,
at 403.
" Hanson, supra note 12, at 981. The commentator also cites boycotts as a major method
used by conferences to maintain rates at a profitable level. Id. Boycotts, however, are an
extreme method of conferences. Consequently, boycotts should not be considered as a basic
tool of the conference system.
" During deliberations over the 1984 Shipping Act, Rep. Rodino displayed such reluc-
tance by stating that the new Act would tolerate only certain concerted activities among
ocean common carriers, thus signifying something less than total commitment to the confer-
ence system as found within the modern international shipping industry. 130 CONG. REC.
H1290 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984). The new Act, however, does allow carriers greater freedom
to operate within a conference system. Friedmann & Devierno, The Shipping Act of 1984:
The Shift From Government Regulation to Shipper "Regulation," 15 J. MAR. L. & CoM.
311, 351 (1984).
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dustry need for stability through conferences.6 4
III. THE SHIPPING ACT OF 1916 AND ITS HISTORY
The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries created the
Shipping Act of 1916 after conducting an extensive investigation
into the practices of the ocean shipping industry. 5 The Committee
published its findings in the Alexander Report,6 6 which acknowl-
edged the benefits of conference systems but found that conference
carriers had to be regulated to prevent any potential abuse of their
collective powers.6 7
The 1916 Shipping Act established a regulatory format requiring
open conferences and granting limited antitrust exemptions to
those conferences." The Act, further, established the Federal Mar-
itime Commission (FMC) as the regulatory mechanism for the
shipping industry." Section 15 of the 1916 Shipping Act immu-
Note, supra note 4, at 644.
Garvey, supra note 2, at 6.
" HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREEMENTS
AND AFFILIATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADE, H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1914) [hereinafter cited as Alexander Report].
" Garvey, supra note 2, at 6, 11. Because shipowners identified the conference system as
necessary within the market structure of international shipping, initial reaction to the Alex-
ander Report was extremely hostile. This negative reaction in 1914 delayed any immediate
legislative response to the Report; however, two years later, Congress passed the 1916 Ship-
ping Act embodying the recommendations of the Alexander Committee. Note, supra note 4,
at 642-43.
The first investigation of the shipping industry was the United Kingdom's Royal Commis-
sion on Shipping Rings (1906-1909). Agman, supra note 27, at 17. The Royal Commission
found the conference system to be beneficial and recommended permitting closed confer-
ences while opposing governmental regulation. The Royal Commission recommended only
the reservation of an undefined role for governmental oversight and investigation in the
event of complaints that important national interests were being transgressed. The British
philosophy was to rely on the countervailing force of collective bargaining between shippers
and carriers as the primary market control. By contrast, the Alexander Report recom-
mended denying the use of closed conferences and placing governmental regulation as the
primary market control. Id. at 18-19.
" Note, supra note 4, at 644; Hanson, supra note 12, at 982-83.
" Garvey, supra note 2, at 11-12. The United States Shipping Board was established as
the original maritime regulatory agency under the 1916 Shipping Act. In 1933, the Shipping
Board was succeeded by the United States Shipping Board Bureau; in 1936 by the United
States Maritime Commission; in 1950 by the Federal Maritime Board; and in 1961 by the
Federal Maritime Commission. In 1961, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) was estab-
lished as the federal agency responsible for promoting the United States merchant marine.
Note, supra note 4, at 645 n.45; see also Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan/Korea v.
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235, 1240 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
984 (1981); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 727 n.1 (1973)
(referring to the history of FMC).
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nized conferences of common carriers that engaged in rationaliza-
tion such as collective rate-setting from antitrust laws.7 ° Under
section 15, conferences were required to file agreements with the
FMC,7 which would then allow or disallow an antitrust exemption
for the filing conferences.72 The FMC was required to verify that
all conference agreements met the general provisions of section
15 .73 This duty was affirmative and existed even in the absence of
complaints as to activities of the conference.74 The Act also listed
prohibited practices which clearly conflicted with the traditional
notions of free enterprise. 7m Prohibited practices included the use
of "fighting ships, '76 "deferred rebates, ' 77 and retaliatory or dis-
70 Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 15, 39 Stat. 733 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 814
(1982)). The immunization was granted provided the ratemaking was authorized by agree-
ments approved by the FMC and provided further that all rates had been properly filed
with the FMC. National Ass'n of Recycling Indus. v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 720 F.2d
618, 618 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1616, (1984).
71 Agreements which must be filed include any agreement:
fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special
rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regu-
lating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings,
losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number
and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the vol-
ume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner
providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The
term "agreement" in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other
arrangements, but does not include maritime labor agreements or any provisions
of such agreements.
Shipping Act of 1916.
7, The FMC was required to disapprove any agreements found:
to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters,
importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign
competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States,
or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this chapter.
Id. Any agreement disapproved by the Commission was considered unlawful. Id.
13 Id. The Commission disapproved, cancelled, or modified agreements only after notice
and hearing. Before approval or disapproval, the agreement was considered unlawful. Id.
"' Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 653 F.2d 544, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
There was also an affirmative duty on conferences to maintain an adequate self-policing
system ensuring that members complied with obligations contained in approved conference
agreements. If the FMC found that a conference failed to police compliance by signatories,
it was empowered to disapprove the conference agreement. The duty of self-policing by con-
ferences was a condition to the granting of any antitrust exemption for those conferences.
Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan/Korea, 650 F.2d at 1239.
11 See Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 14, 39 Stat. 733 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 812
(1982)).
" The term "fighting ship" means a vessel used in a particular trade by a carrier or group
of carriers for the purpose of excluding, preventing or reducing competition by driving an-
other carrier out of said trade. Id. The fighting ship "is one placed on a run to transport
merchandise that might form the nucleus of the cargo for a nonconference steamship, and to
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criminatory rates or services. 78
Whatever workable qualities the original Shipping Act of 1916
may have possessed, the courts and the Department of Justice79
effectively removed that potential through narrow judicial inter-
pretations restricting benefits that could have accrued to the
United States merchant marine.80 For instance, even though a con-
ference was operating pursuant to an FMC-approved agreement,
the finding of a Shipping Act "violation" was held to operate retro-
actively, stripping the conference of its antitrust immunity and
subjecting the liners to extremely detrimental treble damages
actions.81
The Supreme Court sanctioned the greatest limitation on the
do so at rates that were wholly unremunerative." C. McDOwELL & H. GrBss, supra note 3, at
390. The goal is to attract enough consumers away from the competition to cause losses
sufficient to make the competition abandon the trade route. The fighting ship can suffer the
losses from reduced rates because the carrier or carriers, in effect, subsidize the vessel's
operations. Id.
77 The old Act defined the term "deferred rebate" as:
a return of any portion of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a
consideration for the giving of all or any portion of his shipments to the same or
any other carrier, or for any other purpose, the payment of which is deferred be-
yond the completion of the service for which it is paid, and is made only if, during
both the period for which computed and the period of deferment, the shipper has
complied with the terms of the rebate agreement or arrangement.
Shipping Act of 1916, § 14.
' A practice is retaliatory or discriminatory if used by the carrier to:
Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse, space accom-
modations when such are available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair
methods, because such shipper has patronized any other carrier or has filed a com-
plaint charging unfair treatment, or for any other reason.
Make any unfair or unjustly discriminatory contract with any shipper based on
the volume of freight offered, or unfairly treat or unjustly discriminate against any
shipper in the matter of (a) cargo space accommodations or other facilities, due
regard being had for the proper loading of the vessel and the available tonnage;
(b) the loading and landing of freight in proper condition; or (c) the adjustment
and settlement of claims.
Id. Violation of any prohibition was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$25,000 for each offense. Id.
79 Although Congress granted an antitrust immunity to the shipping industry, the other
branches of the government were hostile to the exemption and attacked the immunity at
three points: (1) the implementation of unapproved agreements, (2) the scope of the FMC's
authority to approve agreements, and (3) the standards used by the FMC to approve or
disapprove agreements. Note, supra note 4, at 648.
80 Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 333.
", Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F.Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969). The court found the rates of several conferences so unreasona-
bly low as to have a predatory effect upon a nonconference carrier in the trade and to be
detrimental to the commerce of the United States. Id. at 956-57.
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availability of antitrust immunity when it held that the FMC could
require liner conferences to prove that the proposed agreement or
activity "was required by a serious transportation need, necessary
to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid reg-
ulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.""2 This refinement of the
public interest standard became known as the Svenska standard.8
As a result, the section 15 burden on the FMC to show that an
agreement should not receive antitrust immunity was changed to a
burden on the conferences to show that a proposed agreement
should receive antitrust immunity.8 4 This judicial burden-shifting
resulted in a long and costly procedure for any conference seeking
antitrust immunity.8 5 Compounding the problem, administrative
hearings on the proposed agreement were considered vital, even
though such hearings resulted in lengthy delays."
The Supreme Court also held that any broad use of section 15 to
confer antitrust immunity would conflict with the frequently ex-
82 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 243-
44 (1968). More recently, a court affirmed that the FMC could require that a conference
seeking approval of an agreement "meet the heavy burden of showing that, on balance, the
agreement is in the public interest." Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
653 F.2d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
11 Garvey, supra note 2, at 16. The public interest standard was created initially by a
1961 amendment to the 1916 Shipping Act. Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, § 2, 75
Stat. 762, 763-64. The Svenska interpretation of the public interest standard was the most
significant definition of this standard. See Note, supra note 4, at 650-51. The Svenska deci-
sion and the public interest standard became synonymous, as is reflected by the courts'
reference to Svenska when utilizing the standard. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 739 (1973); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 420 F.2d 577, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For purposes of this Note, the Sven-
ska standard and the public interest standard are synonymous.
" Note, supra note 4, at 650. Although the public interest standard was added by an
amendment to the 1916 Act, Congress never intended to alter the existing presumption in
favor of section 15 agreements. That presumption had placed the burden of going forward
upon opponents of the agreement. In Svenska, the Supreme Court shifted the burden to the
conferences. Id.
85 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 317-18. For example, one trade association
made an antitrust claim against a conference alleging that the conference rates for shipping
wastepaper were unreasonably high even though the rates were otherwise authorized by the
conference agreement and properly filed with the FMC. The antitrust claim extended over
eleven years of administrative and judicial proceedings before the Ninth Circuit finally re-
solved the claim. National Ass'n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 720
F.2d 618, 619 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1616 (1984). The FMC forum has been
used to oppose, to delay, and in some cases to prevent FMC approval of conference agree-
ments. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 317-18.
" Sea-Land Service, 653 F.2d at 551. The Administrative Procedure Act required the
elongated series of hearings, briefs, decisions, appeals, and recourse to other courts utilized
by the FMC under the 1916 Act. Agman, supra note 27, at 29 n.33.
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pressed view that exemptions from antitrust laws are strictly con-
strued.5s The consequences of that holding were destructive, crush-
ing any viability that the 1916 Shipping Act might otherwise have
sustained. Thus, the retroactive application of antitrust penalties,
coupled with the shifted burden of proof and general hostility to-
ward antitrust exemptions, rendered the congressional promise of
antitrust immunity for conferences a nearly useless declaration."
Compounding the merchant marine's problems, the United
States policy of free trade promotion through antitrust laws was
perceived as antagonistic to the shipping policies of other na-
tions.8 9 Responding to the liberal discovery procedures and private
treble damages actions characteristic of the United States system,
other countries promulgated blocking statutes that prohibited
their carriers from disclosing documents under certain circum-
stances and denied the use of their courts to enforce a foreign civil
judgment with a punitive element.90 England even enacted a "claw
back" statute allowing suits by English citizens to recover the pu-
nitive portion of any judgment executed in the United States."
Foreign blocking and claw-back statutes combined with strict do-
mestic enforcement of antitrust policies placed United States lin-
ers in the least favorable of positions.9 2 The new Shipping Act of
1984 is an effort to address the realities of the present shipping
industry and to remove the restraints upon the United States
merchant marine.9 3
" Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. at 733. This case illustrated the Supreme Court's belief
that the 1916 Act conferred very limited antitrust immunity. Note, supra note 4, at 652.
" Fawcett & Nolan, United States Ocean Shipping: The History, Development, and De-
cline of the Conference Antitrust Exemption, 1 Nw. U. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 537, 563-64 (1979).
89 Garvey, supra note 2, at 32.
" Id. at 35.
91 Id.
9' Oversight Hearings on Maritime Antitrust, Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 133-34 (1982)
(testimony of Albert E. May, Executive Vice President, Council of American Flag-Ship Op-
erators). United States laws cannot effectively restrict conferences formed under the laws of
other countries. United States laws, however, can restrict conferences formed by domestic
carriers and thereby place United States carriers at an economic disadvantage relative to
foreign competitors in terms of attaining the economies of scale necessary to operate within
the market structure of the shipping industry. Agman, supra note 27, at 29.
" Rep. Moorhead found four fundamental flaws in the regulatory scheme of the 1916 Act.
First, the standards of approval for an agreement were too unpredictable. Second, the
FMC's actual decisionmaking process was too lengthy, accentuating the uncertainty. Third,
the antitrust laws were enforced unequally to the detriment of United States carriers. Fi-
nally, international relations were strained because trading partners complained that extra-
territorial application of United States antitrust laws was an unfair interference with inter-
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IV. THE 1984 SHIPPING ACT
In congressional hearings prior to the passage of the new Ship-
ping Act, legislators emphasized that the new Act needed to recog-
nize the realities of the shipping industry,4 to provide more logical
and predictable rules for carriers,95 and to allow the United States
merchant marine to compete on an international level.96 Congress
subsequently restated these goals within the context of the Act
through an express declaration of policy. 97 By that declaration,
Congress desired to strengthen the merchant marine, thereby im-
proving the economic well-being and security of the United
States.98 Less than three days after the Shipping Act of 1984 went
into effect,99 the president of the National Maritime Council 00
proclaimed that the new legislation would serve as a "blueprint for
the U.S.-flag merchant marine to compete on a more equal footing
with its foreign counterparts." ''
The new Shipping Act attempted to realize these congressional
policies and improve the former regulatory scheme by revising the
old standards and by responding to antagonistic foreign shipping
practices. First, the new Act reevaluated domestic regulation and
the role of the FMC. The manner by which the government re-
views multicarrier agreements was reformed substantively and pro-
cedurally.10 2 Second, a new international approach was under-
taken. Specific provisions have enabled the FMC to protect United
States carriers from discriminatory and unfair treatment by for-
eign governments or carriers.' 0 3
national commerce. 130 CONG. REc. H1294 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead).
" Id. (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
91 130 CONG. REC. S1569 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
"Id. (statement of Sen. Stevens).
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1701. For a text of this section, see supra note 6.
98 130 CONG. REc. H1296 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Forsythe).
" The new Act was enacted on March 20, 1984, and became effective upon June 18, 1984,
except that §§ 17 and 18 became effective upon enactment. Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1701 note. Sections 17 and 18 granted the FMC authority to begin prescribing in-
terim rules and regulations necessary to carry out the new Act. Id. §§ 1716-17.
'00 The National Maritime Council is a large association of carriers, shippers, and labor
representatives representing a cross-section of the industry. Morison, Tougher Discrimina-
tion Rules Urged, Journal of Commerce, July 27, 1984, at lB. H.R. Del Mar is the current
president of the Council. Del Mar, 1984 Shipping Act Seen Triggering New Approach to
Healthy Industry, Journal of Commerce, May 21, 1984, at 17C.
"' Del Mar, supra note 100, at 17C.
"4 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 313.
"03 Id. at 338.
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A. Domestic Focus
As noted earlier, section 15 of the 1916 Act provided the general
standard of review for carrier agreements.0 4 This standard evolved
into a public interest test. As interpreted by the courts and applied
by the government, the public interest test presented significant
obstacles to the approval of carrier agreements.1 0 5 First, considera-
ble weight was placed on the principles underlying antitrust laws
which are generally hostile to conference systems. Second, liners
were required to prove that even though an agreement was con-
trary to traditional antitrust ideals, other factors warranted its
approval.106
The substantive standard for review of multicarrier agreements
is set forth in section 6(g) of the new Act;107 meanwhile, section 20
clearly provides that the old test under section 15 of the 1916 Act
is no longer applicable to international liner shipping.'0 8 As
worded, the new standard allows the FMC or a court to prohibit
any agreement that is "likely, by a reduction in competition, to
produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an
unreasonable increase in transportation cost."'0 9 From this lan-
guage one may conclude, however, that the new standard only re-
places the public interest standard with an equally general reason-
ableness standard. Such a reasonableness standard may prove even
more elusive than the old public interest standard.
Proponents of the new Act contend that its legislative history
explains in some detail what Congress intended the FMC and the
courts to consider in measuring an agreement against the new
standard.110 First, the legislative history shows that the new stan-
dard gives less weight to antitrust policy and greater deference to
carrier agreements."" Second, Congress apparently intends that
the new standard remove per se condemnation of concerted con-
duct and instead recognize the historical acceptance of conference
"o' See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. Although the 1916 Act did not ex-
pressly prohibit rationalizing steps by carriers, the protracted and arduous procedure re-
quired to gain governmental approval of such efforts tended to discourage rationalization.
Agman, supra note 27, at 6.
106 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 325.
10 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(g).
100 Id. § 1719.
100 Id. § 1705(g) (emphasis added).
, Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 326.
Id.
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agreements in international shipping. " ' A conference report on the
Shipping Act of 1984 provides a three-part test to be applied in
reviewing carrier agreements under the new standard. 13 The test
basically focuses upon whether the proposed agreement will result
in a substantial reduction of competition which is likely to harm
shippers. " 4 This harm must be evidenced in a commercial sense, in
terms of economically unjustified reductions of service or increases
in cost. " 5 Furthermore, even if an agreement substantially reduces
competition and reduces service or increases costs to shippers, it
does not necessarily harm shippers "unreasonably.""' 6 The harm
may be offset by the benefits of an agreement, thus rendering it
reasonable." 7
Seemingly, the new Act replaces the vague section 15 standard
of the old Act with a similarly vague commercial standard. Both
standards actually resemble a form of cost and benefit analysis.
Such standards may benefit the industry. A regulatory standard
written by Congress to provide absolute predictability could impair
the efficiency of carriers and compromise the interests of their
competitors and customers by failing to provide the flexibility nec-
essary to adapt to market conditions or practices.1 8 The export
trading company industry utilizes similarly vague commercial stan-
dards to determine whether certain export trade activities are ex-
12 Id. The new standard is a direct response to the burdensome Svenska standard or
public interest test which was viewed as vague and unworkable in its automatic application
of antitrust principles to ocean shipping. Id.
113 H.R. REP. No. 600, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
"' Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 327. Market share is a factor in assessing
reductions in competition. The market, however, is defined in a broad sense to include not
only ocean common carriers directly serving a trade, but also alternative ocean common
carrier routings, competition from charters, and even competition from air freight carriers.
Moreover, reductions in competition are considered to be partially offset by a member's
right to independent action and ability to enter and to leave the conference freely. The
congressional intention is to make clear that the harm to shippers, in terms of service or
cost, resulted from the agreement and not other factors within the larger market of trans-
portation. Id. Consequently, a higher level of reduction is required to constitute a substan-
tial reduction in relation to the larger conception of the market.
"' Id. at 328. This evidentiary requirement eliminates the Svenska standard's presump-
tion that concerted activity is always harmful. Now, a specific evidentiary showing of a "ma-
terial and meaningful" adverse impact on shippers is necessary before an agreement can be
enjoined. Id.
11 Id. at 327.
" Id. at 328. Benefits offsetting harm include the increased ability of the parties to the
agreement to address problems of rate instability or overcapacity, any efficiency creating
aspects of the agreement, and any favorable impact on United States foreign policy or inter-
national comity. Id. These benefits are given considerable weight. Id. at 329.
"0 Garvey, supra note 2, at 24.
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empt from antitrust laws.119
In another substantive change related to the revision of the old
section 15 standard, Congress expanded the list of prohibited acts
under the new statute.2 ' These additional prohibitions, apparently
a compromise to antitrust advocates, demonstrate the types of ac-
tions which although violative of the old public interest standard,
might still satisfy the new section 6 standard.' 2' Since the commer-
cial reasonableness standard of the 1984 Act shows greater defer-
ence for multicarrier agreements, these prohibitions are in reality
specific limitations upon that deference. Although written in an
absolute form, the parameters of these prohibited acts are not
clearly defined. As one commentator noted, the prohibition list is
replete with activities that are only proscribed if "unjust" or
"unreasonable.' ' 22
Although members of the maritime industry have praised the
new standard as a significant improvement over the old public in-
terest standard, 23 this praise may be premature. The new defer-
ence for conference systems and decreased emphasis on antitrust
principles truly benefit industry members. Indeed, this new atti-
tude combined with the express provisions of the Act will provide
a psychological stimulus to United States liners.12 In reality, how-
ever, the actual standard is just as literally vague and imprecise as
the old standard. Industry members may believe .that the FMC
and the courts will interpret this standard with the appropriate
deference. The 1916 Act attempted to employ a similarly general
standard which was then to be interpreted in the special context of
the shipping industry. As noted, antitrust proponents slowly
" See Export Trading Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982); Note, Multistate
Export Trade Promotion Under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 14 GA. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 155, 175 (1984). Under the Export Trading Company Act, some of the standards
for assessing the legality of an individual's export trading activities refer to substantial les-
sening of competition, to restraint of trade, or to unreasonable depression of prices. See 15
U.S.C. § 4013.
110 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 335-38. For instance, no conference or group
of two or more carriers may (1) boycott or unreasonably refuse to deal, (2) unreasonably
restrict the use of intermodal services, or (3) engage in predatory practices. Shipping Act of
1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1709(c)(1)-(3).
... See Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 336-37.
... Garvey, supra note 2, at 26.
iHs See Del Mar, supra note 100, at 17C; Mongelluzzo, Ship Act Viewed Non-Discrimi-
natory in Benefits, Journal of Commerce, May 16, 1984, at 12A; Shear, Shipping Act
Strengthens Role of US Fleet's Cargo Quest: Shear, Journal of Commerce, May 21, 1984, at
1C.
114 Del Mar, supra note 100, at 17C.
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turned the 1916 legislation into powerless promises which bur-
dened carriers more than it benefited them.
25
A debate is already stirring over whether the Justice Department
or the FMC should approve rules for the use of loyalty contracts. 1" 6
This seemingly technical dispute is significant because it could de-
note the very beginning of a gradual erosion of the favorable defer-
ence for carriers. Since the Justice Department is an advocate of
antitrust principles, carriers contend that requiring approval by
the Justice Department would represent a step back to the old an-
titrust attitudes of the 1916 Act.1 7 This current dispute illustrates
the tension between the Justice Department and the FMC which
could erode the new Act's favorable standard and deference for
multicarrier agreements, as happened with the 1916 Act's
standard.
Substantively, the new Act broadens the actual antitrust immu-
nity provided to carriers, reducing the threat of antitrust liabil-
122 See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
126 See Morison, Contract Rate Rules Trouble Ocean Carriers, Journal of Commerce,
July 19, 1984, at 12A; Morison, Controversy Heats Up Over Dual Rate Systems, Journal of
Commerce, July 23, 1984, at 1B; Morison, New Rules Adopted by FMC: Discount Contract
Rates Included in Regulations Under '84 Shipping Act, Journal of Commerce, Nov. 2, 1984,
at 1A, 12A.
A loyalty contract allows a shipper signatory to such a contract to obtain a lower rate
from the offering carrier or conference in exchange for a promise to ship only with that
carrier or conference. Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 335. The new Act prohibits
the use of a loyalty contract unless in conformity with the antitrust laws. Shipping Act of
1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(9).
The FMC determined that Congress intended that loyalty contracts would be subjected to
both the new Act and the antitrust laws. Service Contracts, Loyalty Contracts, and Publish-
ing and Filing of Tariffs by Common Carriers in the Foreign Commerce of the United
States, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,364, 45,374 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Service Contracts]. Initially,
the FMC required that a loyalty contract be approved by a Business Review Letter from the
Department of Justice indicating that the contract was within the antitrust laws. Id. at
45,373. Due to numerous complaints from carriers and conferences, however, the FMC de-
leted the mandatory requirement of a Business Review Letter. Id. at 45,373-74. In its final
rules for implementation of the new Act, the FMC stated that the filing of a Business Re-
view Letter would create a presumption of legality for the reviewed loyalty contract. Id. at
45,390 (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 580.16).
1"1 Morison, Contract Rate Rules Trouble Ocean Carriers, supra note 126, at 12A. The
Justice Department denounces the use of conference systems. Ellsworth, supra note 40, at
498.
Arguably, the resolution of this issue is moot because loyalty contracts ultimately will be
replaced by service contracts which are approved by the new Act. Morison, Controversy
Heats Up Over Dual Rate Systems, supra note 126, at lB. For an explanation of the differ-
ence between a loyalty contract and a service contract, see infra notes 147-50 and accompa-
nying text.
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ity.12s To qualify for antitrust exemption, a carrier agreement must
meet the requirements of section 5,129 which include filing provi-
sions and guidelines. 30 Unlike the prior law,131 an activity or agree-
ment, entered into with a "reasonable basis to conclude" that it is
pursuant to an agreement on file with the FMC, is immunized
from antitrust laws.13 2 This reasonable basis defense applies even
where the conference pursuant to an FMC-approved agreement
undertakes an activity prohibited under the new Act.133 Reasona-
128 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 332.
110 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1704.
110 Id. § 1704(a). The only agreements exempted from the filing requirements are "agree-
ments related to transportation to be performed within or between foreign countries and
agreements among common carriers to establish, operate, or maintain a marine terminal in
the United States." Id.
The 1984 Act provides that each conference agreement must:
(1) state its purpose;
(2) provide reasonable and equal terms and conditions for admission and read-
mission to conference membership for any ocean common carrier willing to serve
the particular trade or route;
(3) permit any member to withdraw from conference membership upon reasona-
ble notice without penalty;
(4) at the request of any member, require an independent neutral body to police
fully the obligations of the conference and its members;
(5) prohibit the conference from engaging in conduct prohibited by Section
10(c)(1) or (3) of this Act [46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(c)(1), (3)];
(6) provide for a consultation process designed to promote-
(A) commercial resolution of disputes, and
(B) cooperation with shippers in preventing and eliminating
malpractices;
(7) establish procedures for promptly and fairly considering shippers' requests
and complaints; and
(8) provide that any member of the conference may take independent action on
any rate or service item required to be filed in a tariff under section 8(a) of this
Act [46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(a)] upon not more than 10 calendar days' notice to the
conference and that the conference will include the new rate or service item in its
tariff for use by that member, effective no later than 10 calendar days after receipt
of the notice, and by any other member that notifies the conference that it elects
to adopt the independent rate or service item on or after its effective date, in lieu
of the existing conference tariff provision for that rate or service item.
Id. § 1704(b).
The FMC has issued final regulations outlining the filing and form requirements for
agreements, including provisions for the content and organization of agreements. See Agree-
ments by Ocean Common Carriers and Other Persons Subject to the Shipping Act of 1984,
49 Fed. Reg. 45,351, 45,355-58 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. §§ 572.401-.406, 572.501-
.502).
"s See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(a)(2).
1 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 333. The new Act provides: "[any determi-
nation by any agency or court that results in the denial or removal of the immunity to the
antitrust laws set forth in subsection (a) shall not remove or alter the antitrust immunity for
270
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ble mistakes are not punished by treble damages actions. A factual
finding that a carrier had no reasonable basis to conclude that its
action or agreement was exempt must be made before that carrier
can be prosecuted under antitrust laws.13 4 Importantly, a com-
plainant would bear the burden of proving that no reasonable basis
existed, justifying the carrier's actions.' s5 The new Act, therefore,
removes further the threatening treble damages action which sig-
nificantly curtails rationalization by United States carriers. Such a
change adds substance to the promises of the new Act.
The 1984 Shipping Act contains two further changes designed to
facilitate improvement of the merchant marine. First, section
5(b)(8) 136 requires that every conference agreement provide that
any conference member may take independent action on any rate
or service item required to be filed in a tariff.'3 7 Second, service
contracts are now permitted.'38 These two new provisions are es-
sentially designed to check the newly established powers of carriers
by enhancing shipper negotiating power' 39 and stimulating market
interaction between carriers and shippers.
The mandatory right of independent action is conceptually ap-
pealing because it can act as an internal check on conference pow-
ers. If conference rates exceed economic justifications, then hypo-
thetically an astute carrier would recognize the potential for an
increased market share and profit in a rate reduction. The astute
carrier would file for a right of independent action, and the confer-
the period before the determination." Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1706(c)(1).
134 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 333-34.
'" Since the Svenska standard is no longer applicable, the burden is once again on the
FMC or complainants to prove that agreements violate the new Act. See supra note 112
(noting Congress' disapproval of the Svenska standard); Friedmann & Devierno, supra note
63, at 332 (noting that the burden of proof has shifted from proponents of an agreement
back to the FMC).
,36 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1704(b)(8).
"I For the text of this provision, see supra note 130.
138 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c). The new Act defines a service contract
as:
[A] contract between a shipper and an ocean common carrier or conference in
which the shipper makes a commitment to provide a certain minimum quantity of
cargo over a fixed time period, and the ocean common carrier or conference com-
mits to a certain rate or rate schedule as well as a defined service level - such as,
assured space, transit time, port rotation, or similar service features; the contract
may also specify provisions in the event of nonperformance on the part of either
party.
Id. § 1702(21).
,39 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 340.
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ence within 10 days of the filing would allow the action.140 Hypo-
thetically, the carrier would then attract shippers with the new
lower rates and other carriers would be forced to match the price
reductions to maintain current levels of activity. The mandatory
right of independent action would serve as the market regulator
replacing governmental regulation. 41 The mandatory right, how-
ever, weakens the conference by sanctioning the very destructive
pricing patterns that governmental regulation attempts to
prevent. 42
In contrast to the mandatory right of independent action, service
contracts are indirect checks on conference powers. They increase
the importance of carrier-shipper negotiation and consultation.'43
Such freedom to negotiate can allow both carriers and shippers to
search contractually for a market equilibrium in this unique mar-
ket structure. Under prior law, such contracts were unlawfully dis-
criminatory and conflicted with antitrust laws. 14 Section 8(c) of
the 1984 Act 145 authorizes the use of service contracts by an ocean
common carrier or conference with a shipper or shippers' associa-
tion. 46 It is difficult to distinguish conceptually a service contract
140 The 1984 Act requires that a conference respond to a request for independent action
within 10 calendar days after receipt of notice. Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. §
1704(b)(8).
141 See Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 340, 351.
"4 Rockwell, Shippers Debate Effect of Act on Conferences, Journal of Commerce, Oct.
16, 1984, at 1A, 3A; see also Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 517 (arguing further that even
nonconference carriers should be prevented from disrupting the rationalization program of a
conference).
141 Cf. Agman, supra note 27, at 34-38 (discussing the use of commercial consultation and
negotiation rather than governmental regulation as a means to ensure equitable treatment
between shippers and carriers).
'44 See Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 345.
145 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1707(c).
140 A concise statement of essential terms of a service contract must be filed with the
FMC. Id. The essential terms include:
(1) the origin and destination port ranges in the case of port-to-port movements, and the
origin and destination geographic areas in the case of through intermodal movements;
(2) the commodity or commodities involved;
(3) the minimum volume;
(4) the line-haul rate;
(5) the duration;
(6) service commitments; and
(7) the liquidated damages for nonperformance, if any.
Id. The only service contracts exempted from these filing requirements are those contracts
dealing with bulk cargo, forest products, recycled metal scrap, waste paper, or paper waste.
Id.
There is no substantive difference between a service contract and a time/volume contract.
The time/volume contract is simply a sub-category of the service contract. Service Con-
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from a loyalty contract, which is prohibited by the new Act unless
exercised in conformity with the antitrust laws. 14 7 The fear and
consequential prohibition of loyalty contracts are probably
founded upon the belief that such contracts would be based upon
noncommercial criteria and would lack mutuality of contractual
commitment between the conference of carriers and individual
shippers. 148  By contrast, service contracts involve mutual ex-
changes of commitment and are more clearly motivated by justifia-
ble economic considerations."I9 The distinction is rapidly growing
irrelevant as service contracts become a predominant tool for ra-
tionalization by conferences. 50 Carriers support these contracts be-
cause they can provide a steady demand for services. Shippers sup-
port these contracts because they can produce more favorable rate
and service terms. 51 Already, shippers and carriers are seeking the
stability and efficiency of service contracts. 52 The success of ser-
vice contracts will depend to a large degree upon the ability of
tracts, supra note 126, at 45,372.
'17 The new Act defines a loyalty contract as "a contract with an ocean common carrier or
conference, other than a service contract or contract based upon time-volume rates, by
which a shipper obtains lower rates by committing all or a fixed portion of its cargo to that
carrier or conference." Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(14) (emphasis added).
The conceptual difficulty arises because loyalty contracts are defined as "other than" service
contracts. Yet, the two types of contracts are not mutually exclusive since both involve tying
arrangements. See Agman, supra note 27, at 5 (as evidence that commentators view these
types of arrangements similarly, this particular commentator seems to classify all these
types of arrangements as loyalty arrangements).
48 The new Act allows loyalty contracts if they are in conformity with antitrust laws.
Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(9). Obtaining approval under the antitrust
laws, however, could prove to be an extremely difficult task. See supra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text.
"' This mutuality of commitment argument was offered to explain the difference between
time/volume contracts and service contracts. The FMC rejected the argument, noting that
Congress was silent on the existence of a difference, and consequently, the FMC would as-
sume that Congress did not intend a distinction. Service Contracts, supra note 126, at
45,372. Here, however, Congress was not silent. Clearly, Congress restricted loyalty contracts
yet permitted service contracts. Thus, in distinguishing the two types of contract, the mutu-
ality of commitment argument should apply. Moreover, since the loyalty contract lacks mu-
tuality of contractual commitment, it resembles a monopolistic exercise of power. This ex-
plains why the loyalty contract is prohibited and the service contract is allowed.
0 Morison, Controversy Heats Up Over Dual Rate Systems, supra note 126, at lB.
Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 345.
See Dunlap, Maritime Industry Change Called 2-Edged Sword, Journal of Commerce,
Oct. 12, 1984, at 12A; Morison, Controversy Heats Up Over Dual Rate Systems, supra note
126, at 1B; Morison, FMC Takes Lenient Stand On First Service Contract, Journal of Com-
merce, July 12, 1984, at 24B (noting that the FMC had rejected a protest to a service
contract).
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shippers to gain effective negotiating power.153
Procedurally, the new Act does contain significant improvements
over the old Act. Under the old law, carrier agreements were not
effective until the FMC approved the agreement; carriers had the
burden of proving that approval was warranted under the regula-
tory standard. Furthermore, no time limits existed for FMC review
of proposed agreements. 15" Consequently, opponents of a carrier
agreement had substantial leverage to delay the agreement for
years within the FMC or the courts.1 55 A primary goal of the new
Act is to remove these delays and provide carriers a real and mean-
ingful immunity. 56
Specifically, the new Act places time limitations on the FMC re-
view of an agreement.1 57 When an agreement is properly filed with
the FMC, the FMC should submit the agreement for publication in
the Federal Register within seven days of its FMC filing.158 The
agreement then automatically becomes effective 45 days after fil-
ing, 59 unless the FMC seeks and obtains a court injunction on the
grounds that the agreement does not meet the general standard of
review. 160 Under section 6(h) of the new Act,61 the FMC rather
than the shipper must prove that an agreement does not meet the
standard.1 6 2 Members of the maritime industry believe that this
new procedural approach will greatly benefit carriers in imple-
menting profitable agreements.'6 " Carriers ultimately should be
able to respond more quickly to changing market conditions.
1' See infra text accompanying notes 202-13 (discussing the use of shippers' associations
which would have more negotiating power than individual shippers).
11 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 329; supra notes 85-86 and accompanying
text.
Dunlap, supra note 152, at 12A; Shear, supra note 123, at 1C.
' Shear, supra note 123, at 1C.
15 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 330.
I" Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(a).
15 Id. § 1705(c)(1). The FMC may request additional information or documentary mate-
rial it deems necessary to make a proper determination. Id. § 1705(d). If additional informa-
tion is requested, the agreement becomes effective 45 days after the FMC receives the re-
quested material or as much of the requested material as can be supplied. Id. § 1705(c).
1 0 Id. § 1705(h). The FMC may bring suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to enjoin operation of the agreement. Id.
101 Id.
16' "In a suit under this subsection, the burden of proof is on the Commission [FMC]."
Id; see also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 330 (discussing this burden).
10" See Dunlap, supra note 152, at 12A.
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B. International Focus
The domestic approach could generally be classified as an effort
to reduce governmental regulation. On the other hand, the new in-
ternational approach clearly represents an increase in governmen-
tal regulation. 1 4 The new Act specifically provides that the FMC
should protect United States common carriers from discriminatory
and unfair treatment by foreign governments or carriers.6 5 By re-
sponding to the unfair practices of trading partners, Congress ulti-
mately intends to achieve an open marketplace in international
shipping where United States liners can participate equally. 66
Under section 13(b)(5) of the 1984 Act,167 the FMC may take
retaliatory action in cases where foreign governments or carriers
deny a United States carrier access to cross-trade."6 ' Under author-
ity of the 1984 Act, the FMC has issued regulations outlining con-
ditions which unduly impair the access. of United States vessels to
ocean trade between foreign ports and specifying what actions may
be taken to address these conditions.169 The FMC has stated that
it will respond with section 13 sanctions only when United States
liners are actually harmed. 70 Otherwise, the FMC will not inter-
fere with the normal forces of competition in the marketplace.
The FMC will find a condition of unduly impaired access only
where a United States carrier is commercially able to enter a trade
but is precluded or reasonably expects preclusion, or where actual
participation in a trade is restricted for reasons other than com-
mercial ability or competitiveness. 71 Any vessel documented under
4 See Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 338.
"" Shipping Act of 1984, § 1712(b)(5).
, Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 338.
Shipping Act of 1984, § 1712(b)(5).
, Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 339.
16 Actions to Address Conditions Unfavorable to Shipping in the Foreign Trade of the
United States and Conditions Unduly Impairing Access of U.S.-Flag Vessels to Ocean Trade
Between Foreign Ports, 49 Fed. Reg. 45,397, 45,407-08 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. §§
587.2, .7) [hereinafter cited as Impaired Access Regulations].
' Ericson, FMC Circulates Rules Preparing for New Act, Journal of Commerce, May 21,
1984, at 24B.
" Impaired Access Regulations, supra note 169, at 45,406 (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. §
587.1(c)). Factors indicating conditions unduly impairing access include, but are not limited
to:
(a) Imposition upon U.S.-flag vessels or upon shippers or consignees using such
vessels, of fees, charges, requirements, or restrictions different from those imposed
on national-flag or other vessels, or which preclude or tend to preclude U.S.-flag
vessels from competing in the trade on the same basis as any other vessel.
(b) Reservation of a substantial portion of the total cargo in the trade to na-
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the laws of the United States which believes that its access to
ocean trade between foreign ports has been, or will be, unduly im-
paired may file a petition for relief. 1 7 The FMC may respond with
equalization fees, limitation of sailings, or suspension of tariffs.' 71
Section 13(b)(5) is a potentially powerful tool for responding to
European closed conferences and the cargo preference statutes of
foreign governments. 174 This type of international approach is ap-
pealing to the United States businessman who reads that the
merchant marine is declining and that only 4.2% of all United
States export and import trade is handled by domestic carriers.
The potential for escalating international tension, however, is ex-
tremely high. Already, European nations and Japan are calling for
diplomatic efforts before retaliatory actions are employed by the
United States.'7 5 Recognizing the seriousness of retaliatory actions
in an international market, the FMC regulations require notifica-
tion be given to the Secretary of State when conditions unduly im-
pairing access exist. The FMC may request that the Secretary of
tional-flag or other vessels which results in failure to provide reasonable competi-
tive access to cargoes by U.S.-flag vessels.
(c) Use of predatory practices, possibly including but not limited to closed con-
ferences employing fighting ships or deferred rebates, which unduly impair access
of a U.S.-flag vessel to the trade.
(d) Any government or commercial practice that results in, or may result in,
unequal and unfair opportunity for U.S.-flag vessel access to port or intermodal
facilities or services related to the carriage of cargo inland to or from ports in the
trade.
(e) Any other practice which unduly impairs access of a U.S.-flag vessel to trade
between foreign ports.
Id. at 45,407 (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.2).
172 Id. (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.3(a)(1)).
173 Id. at 45,408 (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.7(b)). A civil penalty of up to $50,000
may be imposed for every violation of a tariff suspension. Id.
174 Dunlap, supra note 152, at 12A, 24B (opinion of Thomas Moakley of the Federal Mar-
itime Administration).
175 Morison, FMC Urged: Go Slowly On Ship Act - Foreign Flags Want Time To Pre-
vent Retaliatory Action, Journal of Commerce, Aug. 14, 1984, at 1A. Recently, the State
Department and the Department of Transportation said that the FMC might have to sus-
pend the tariffs of Philippine-flag operators in response to a proposed cargo-sharing plan of
the Philippine government. The cargo-sharing plan divided 80 percent of the market along
the United States-Philippine trade route equally between the two countries, with the re-
maining 20 percent available to cross-traders. The FMC received numerous complaints
about the plan from shippers and third-flag carriers. The threatened retaliation represented
an effort by the federal government to keep world shipping lanes open to as much competi-
tion as possible. Robb, US-Philippine Cargo-Sharing Problem Ends, Journal of Commerce,
July 27, 1984, at lB. This scenario demonstrates that the United States does not plan to use
the new Act as protectionist legislation solely for the benefit of United States carriers. In-
stead, the new Act can serve as a catalyst to development of trade routes.
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State seek resolution of the matter through diplomatic channels.17 6
As a final check on section 13 sanctions, the FMC must notify the
President of the United States of proposed penalties. The Presi-
dent may disapprove the sanctions within 10 days after receiving
such notice if necessary for reasons of national defense or foreign
policy of the United States.1 77 Apparently section 13 is a threat
intended to stimulate trade partners to include United States lin-
ers in cross-trade. Nonetheless, diplomatic consciousness pervades
the provision.
C. What is the effect?
Both carriers and shippers have accepted the new focuses and
approaches of the 1984 Act and are claiming legislative victory for
all parties.17 8 Carriers are entering and filing many new agreements
which would have been prohibited under the old 1916 Act.179
These agreements are attempts at rationalization and implementa-
tion of a viable conference system."' ° These conferences, however,
are still subject to criticism.
Opponents of the 1984 Act contend that the former regulatory
scheme of the 1916 Shipping Act conformed with traditional no-
tions of antitrust while providing a framework tailored to the spe-
cial needs of the shipping industry."' Indeed, the prior regulatory
scheme may have worked well in periods of steady growth. During
the 1970's, however, the Arab oil embargo touched off a general
recession which ended the steady growth of, and reduced the de-
mand for, shipping and exposed the weaknesses in the former reg-
ulatory scheme. 182 Suddenly, the supply of liner services greatly ex-
"' Impaired Access Regulations, supra note 169, at 45,408 (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. §
587.6).
'I" Id. (to be codified at 46 C.F.R. § 587.8-.9).
M78 See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 152, at 12A; Del Mar, supra note 100, at 17C.
'' As of Oct. 1, 1984, 157 agreements had been filed with the FMC. Of these agreements
filed, none have been rejected or enjoined, and 88 agreements were already in effect. Dun-
lap, supra note 152, at 12A.
,6* For an explanation of the benefits from rationalization within a conference system, see
supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
181 Sen. Metzenmbaum vigorously opposed the 1984 Shipping Act claiming that it was
contrary to the national commitment to free enterprise. Sen. Metzenmbaum relied heavily
upon the GAO Report suggesting that legislative reform was unwarranted. 130 CONG. REC.
S1578-600 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenmbaum).
"I' H.R. REP. No. 53 (Pt. 1), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 53]. In 1983, the world's oceangoing traffic declined by 2.6%, marking the fourth consec-
utive annual drop. Cullison, Japanese Ship Lines Urged to Diversify, Journal of Commerce,
July 20, 1984, at 24B. There is little evidence to indicate that the decline will cease anytime
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ceeded demand for those services, resulting in overtonnaging of
United States trades. The primary reason for the overtonnaging
was the regulatory system imposed by the Shipping Act of 1916.83
United States carriers were prevented from rationalizing effectively
in order to operate efficiently within the special market structure
of shipping. 18' The recessionary world economy triggered and mag-
nified the weaknesses in the former Act.
Heavy criticism of the new Act has also come from trading part-
ners of the United States."'5 Section 13(b)(5) is a focal point. For-
eign countries view that provision as an unjustifiable infringement
upon their domestic affairs and sovereignty. 86 Congress specifi-
cally provided that the new Act would apply only to agreements
among ocean common carriers or terminal operators to the extent
that the agreements involve ocean transportation in the foreign
commerce of the United States. 8 7 Thus, a foreign carrier is subject
to the regulation only when it functions within the foreign com-
merce of the United States. Consequently, submission to the regu-
lation may be viewed as voluntary. United States industry mem-
bers applaud the new Act for its demand of reciprocal treatment
among all carriers. 8
Such foreign criticism is not novel and is not the primary result
of any new regulatory provision. Indeed, the new Act moves toward
less overall governmental regulation.8 " The foreign carriers, how-
ever, want no governmental regulation. European and Japanese
carriers claim that the methods of implementing the new Act are
uncertain. These carriers fear that the uncertainty will restrict
soon. Id.
,83 Note, supra note 4, at 653.
' Rationalizing steps were not expressly prohibited under the 1916 Act; however, the
framework of the old Act tended to discourage the undertaking. Agman, supra note 27, at 6.
During deliberations over the new 1984 Act, Rep. Jones blamed the courts, not the regula-
tory scheme of the old Act, for its failure.
The 1916 Shipping Act that has regulated international ocean commerce all
these years had outlived its original purpose, not because it was basically unsound,
but because its broad and general language was gradually interpreted by courts in
ways that have burdened that United States steamship industry which it was orig-
inally designed to assist.
130 CONG. RIc. H1289 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1984).
188 See Morison, supra note 175, at 1A.
1 See id.
187 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1703.
188 Morison, supra note 100, at lB. The National Maritime Council contends that the
FMC should prevent 'discriminatory actions against United States carriers operating be-
tween foreign ports and respond to the growth of trade and shipping protectionism. Id.
188 Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 351.
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them from structuring their own affairs and rationalizing.190 The
Japanese specifially cite the mandatory right of independent action
as an open inducement to rate-wars. 191 Thus, the new Act is not
simply criticized because it has new approaches or provisions. The
true criticism of the new Act is a more general denouncement of
any regulation which prevents closed conferences or cargo-prefer-
ence arrangements which foreign concerns have developed to
strengthen their own merchant marines.
V. A PROPOSAL
The true test of any legislative reform in the area of shipping is
whether it will actually strengthen the United States merchant
marine. Proposals for regulatory reform have generally concen-
trated on extending antitrust immunity for ocean common carriers
and diminishing the regulatory role of the FMC.19 2 Simply, the
goal is to allow United States liners to ship like international lin-
ers. ' Such an approach is necessary. Businessmen face the reality
of a unique international shipping market; therefore, Congress
should not impose upon them the inconsistent ideology of antitrust
philosophies.19 The real challenge is to determine which market
,90 See Ericson, Conferences Fire Barbs at FMC Pacts Proposal, Journal of Commerce,
Oct. 24, 1984, at 12A. The Council of European and Japanese National Shipowners' Associa-
tion opposed FMC guidelines explaining how antitrust exemption is approved under the
1984 Act. The guidelines provide for rejection of any agreement that is not clear and com-
plete. The conferences complain that ". . . neither the Ten Commandments, U.S. Constitu-
tion nor any other written compact ... would pass full muster under rigid application of
such subjective and semantic standards." Id.
" Cullison, Impact of US Ship Act on Trade Worries Japan, Journal of Commerce,
June 28, 1984, at 24B.
"' Garvey, supra note 2, at 2.
193 During debate over the 1984 Act, Sen. Gorton stated:
A primary goal of this bill, of course, is to bring our regulations somewhat more
into line with those of our foreign trading partners and competitors and to see to
it that our merchant marine spends less of its money defending itself in court and
dealing with regulatory agencies and spends more of it in providing competitive
services.
130 CONG. REc. S1570 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984).
"' Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 333. Businessmen understand that Congress cannot impose
United States antitrust laws on trading partners through unilateral legislation and then seek
to continue trade with those partners. See Presentation by Ralph Rugan, Jr., Developing
Trends in Liner Shipping, The Institute on Foreign Transportation and Port Operations,
Tulane University, New Orleans (Apr. 30, 1981). Indeed, the United States is the most ex-
tensive regulator of carrier conferences. Garvey, supra note 2, at 36. By comparison, Mexico
has attempted to strengthen its merchant marine by embarking on an ambitious shipbuild-
ing and ship-purchasing program as well as streamlining registry rules and directing that
governmental cargo be carried when possible on Mexican ships. Orme, Latins Urge Liner
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 15:249
structure best allows the merchant marine to function in a real ec-
onomic sense.
Much of the current deterioration in the merchant marine is at-
tributable to the free market emphasis of antitrust laws. e5 Within
a totally free market, United States carriers could not survive. 96
Foreign liners would have the advantage of strong conferences
while United States carriers would be burdened by antitrust laws
denying the use of conferences in the name of free enterprise. 9 '
Congress recognized this perilous situation, and sanctioned in the
1984 Shipping Act limited use of the conference system. The con-
ferences are limited in the sense that they must be open to entry
and to exit by any carrier.
The flaws in the open conference approach are significant. First,
open conferences inherently create overtonnaging and higher
rates. 1 8 Second, the mandatory right of independent action under-
mines control over rates and tonnage levels.199 An alternative ap-
proach is necessary. Since neither the free market nor the open
conference approach is preferable, a closed conference approach
may seem a logical alternative.
Arguably, closed conferences lead to monopolistic prices and
Code Adoption: Many Feel Guidelines Primarily Applies to 3rd World Shipping, Journal
of Commerce, Oct. 15, 1984, at 5A.
1" See Hanson, supra note 12, at 993-98 (analyzing the problems associated with a com-
petitive system). The commentator notes that abolition of conferences (a free market) would
disadvantage United States carriers and impede realization of a strong and competitive na-
tional flag fleet. Id. at 996.
One commentator suggests that a free market approach is not workable because free entry
and exit from the shipping industry are not present. Free entry and exit are necessary for
the functioning of a competitive market. Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 502. The commentator
suggests that free competition would lead to a more oligopolistic industry. Id. at 497. For a
discussion of the absence of free entry and exit in the shipping industry, see supra notes 35-
42 and accompanying text.
One British commentator concluded that "unbridled competition can be positively detri-
mental to the interests of shippers and shipowners alike." Rose, New Lines for Conference
Lines, 1982 LLOv'S MA & CoM. L. Q. 636, 636.
" United States carriers would sustain heavy losses during the transition to a nonconfer-
ence system. Hanson, supra note 12, at 996.
' Foreign flag operators would have significant competitive advantages. Id. at 997-98.
1" Hanson, supra note 12, at 989-90. The commentator concludes that the current open
conference system is the worst possible system from an economic standpoint. Id. at 999.
I" Conference members contend that any strengthening of the conference system by the
1984 Act was offset by the mandatory right of independent rate-setting action. Rockwell,
supra note 142, at 1A, 3A. From June 18 to mid-August of 1984, the Pacific Westbound
Conference experienced 900 applications for independent action. Id. (statement of Patrick
Moffett, Manager of International Traffic and Sales at Autiovox Corporation). See also
supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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profits. Moreover, a closed conference if legalized could consist en-
tirely of foreign carriers to the exclusion of United States liners.
Consequently, the use of closed conferences is a proposal that must
be approached with caution.
The best approach appears to be the utilization of semi-closed
conferences. Congress could eliminate the mandatory right of inde-
pendent action and allow conferences to deny re-entry to a carrier
which exercises an independent action. The conference would oth-
erwise be open to entry by any carrier with the commercial capa-
bility. These changes would allow conferences to exercise more
control over their member carriers and to rationalize more effec-
tively. Conferences must have this power to address overtonnaging,
to tailor supply to fit demand, and to operate at economically ra-
tional levels.200
The fear of monopolistic pricing policies by large conferences is
conceptually significant. However, there is no evidence that closed
conferences inherently follow monopolistic practices.201 Further-
more, if Congress allowed associations of shippers to form for the
purpose of negotiating with conferences, a strong internal market
control would exist. These shippers' associations or shippers' coun-
cils would have the size to negotiate on equal terms with large car-
riers and conferences. 20 2 Section 10(b)(13) of the new Act prohibits
common carriers from refusing to negotiate with a shippers' associ-
ation .203 Both Great Britain and Australia have found the use of
shippers' councils to be a positive control mechanism replacing ex-
tensive governmental regulation.2°'
Under the 1984 Shipping Act, the role of shippers' associations is
uncertain. The Act defines shippers' associations,205 but beyond
this definition, there are no specific provisions outlining the rights
or functions of such associations. The 1984 Act does not subject
2zo See Hanson, supra note 12, at 991; Note, supra note 4, at 661. Justice Harlan, in a
concurrence to the famous Svenska decision, recognized that "both shipping and antitrust
factors" must be considered in assessing carriers' conduct. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Ak-
tiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 253 (1968).
10' See Hanson, supra note 12, at 987-89. Available data suggest that closed conferences
offer lower rates than those posted by open conferences. Id. at 987.
212 Rockwell, Shippers Await Clear-Cut Definition of Associations, Journal of Commerce,
Oct. 17, 1984, at IA, 5A. See also Friedmann & Devierno, supra note 63, at 340.
202 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1709(b)(13).
"'i Agman, supra note 27, at 20, 22.
200 A shippers' association is a group of shippers that consolidates or distributes freight on
a nonprofit basis for the members of the group in order to secure carload, truckload, or
other volume rates or service contracts. Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702(24).
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shippers' associations to direct, on-going affirmative regulation by
the FMC. The Conference Report accompanying the Shipping Act
of 1984 indicates that legal issues arising from the formation of
shippers' associations are matters falling within the jurisdiction of
other federal agencies. 20
6
Currently, shippers are not forming associations because they
fear that such associations would be subject to antitrust penal-
ties.20 7 Cooperative activities of shippers in obtaining reduced rates
will not likely violate antitrust laws if the group does not possess
"threatening market power." 08 In any event, associations can seek
Business Review Letters from the Department of Justice and Advi-
sory Opinions from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to pro-
vide the shippers with advice on whether their contemplated con-
certed actions comply with antitrust laws.20 9  The Justice
Department and FTC should allow the formation of shippers' as-
sociations. Shippers' councils would serve as counterbalances to
strong conferences. These groups would occupy a natural regula-
tory position within the industry itself.10
Conferences and shippers' associations do not present significant
barriers to entry or eliminate small and independent business par-
ticipants. 2 1 There is no evidence that a closed conference prevents
entry by liners as either members or independent competitors any
more than an open conference.21 2 Moreover, independent carriers
can restrain the rates of closed conferences and pass some savings
to shippers.213 Small shippers or shippers with irregular shipping
patterns could even possibly sustain a market within the market
for independent carriers.
'" Status of Shippers' Association Under the Shipping Act, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,799,
21,799 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Shippers' Associations].
'07 Rockwell, supra note 202, at 1A.
108 Shippers' Associations, supra note 206, at 21,799.
109 Id. Shippers may consider forming export trading companies and applying for anti-
trust exemption through an export trading certificate of review. See Export Trading Com-
pany Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982). The Export Trading Company Act, however,
would not aid importer associations. See Armbruster, Solution Offered to Shippers' Anti-
trust Problem, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 31, 1984, at 18A.
110 Shipper regulation would replace governmental regulation. Freidmann & Devierno,
supra note 63, at 351.
1 Nonconference competition would function within the "umbrella" of the conference
rate structure. Agman, supra note 27, at 5.
, Note, supra note 4, at 660-61. "Closed conferences, which are somewhat of a misnomer
as new members are accepted from time to time, are not permitted under American law but
are the rule in most other trades of the world." Agman, supra note 27, at 5.
' Hanson, supra note 12, at 991.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The 1984 Shipping Act is a beneficial move for both domestic
carriers and shippers. The Act lessens regulatory hardships, al-
lowing carriers to utilize the conference system in an effort to oper-
ate more efficiently. United States policy must further recognize
that the liner shipping industry is not like other strictly domestic
industries where the United States is unquestionably sovereign
over its activities.2" United States policy must acknowledge the
necessity of stronger conferences and shippers' associations. Such a
commitment would allow the United States shipping industry to
form a market structure which could address the problems inher-
ent within international shipping. A stronger conference and asso-
ciation approach would also conform more with international prac-
tice, thereby eliminating some of the criticism from trading
partners. 15 Although Congress cannot legislate economic recovery,
Congress can allow the United States shipping industry to settle
into a workable market structure geared for economic efficiency.
R. Dale Hughes
214 See Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 500.
"' Hong Kong shippers praise the 1984 Act, explaining that now they can interact with
United States carriers as they do with carriers of other nations. Bangsberg, Hong Kong
Shippers Bullish on US Ship Act, Journal of Commerce, July 6, 1984, at lB.
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